History and military technology: Interview with a former Type-59 tanker in the Army of Albania

A former Type-59 tanker in the Army of Albania was kind enough to accept an interview for my blog. T. was conscripted in the Army of Albania in the late 90s and early 2000s, when the situation in the region was very difficult. This country was also the sole user of Chinese equipment.

1. Hello T., many thanks for accepting an interview with http://alejandro-8.blogspot.com. Could you provide an introduction to your service in the Army of Albania?

4th Assault Battalion. Dhuvjan, Southern Albania. Due to the situation in the Balkans, my specialty training and affectation were in Northern Albania in Laç from March 1999 to September 1999. Served from Jan 1999 to December 2000 as enlisted. Was discharged without a grade (as enlisted) officially in 7th January 2001.

2. What do you think were the strong and weak points of the Type-59 tanks when you served?

Strong points. Simple and mostly reliable machine. very little electronics (except second hand Radios SEM-35, probably from German stocks). Very easy to understand and operate (when things were ok).

Weak points. Worn out machines in 1999 (mine was delivered in 1973), very crude compared to many things I saw NATO military vehicles have by then. Very maintenance prone in engine and suspension area after each march. The origin of the tank was also a problem, we were resolutely going West and there were little efforts done to procure spares be that in China or other former WarPact.

3. When training, what was the typical distance to the objective and speed of the tank when you fired the main gun? And the longest distance at which you ever fired?

Most marches were within 25 KM because of the state of the tank. Only during the Kosovo "non-deployment" did we cross about 60km to position next to the border. No trailers mostly. Never exceed speed 25km on cross country, tank could go faster but with direct repercussions to engine and workload at stop. Pavement speed mostly 35/40 but mostly under those levels.

As for the fire drills, 4 ranges for direct fire. 400/800/1200/1600m
firing on the move was not done, although we had tables for it. But stabilizer was mostly a joke for that.
Indirect fire up to 3000m. However tank lacked proper reference sights.

4. How did you find the Type-59 construction quality? And Chinese equipment in general?

Chinese construction compared to the other T-55 we had still available wasn't too bad. These weren't second hand tanks from China, they were built for the Albanian Army. So they were new when they came. However compared to T-55 main issues were optical parts which weren't as sturdy as Soviet ones. Sealing was also a problem on commander sight and so we swapped some components from storage T-54/55. Clearances for some critical parts like dome ventilator were also complicated (sometimes part was slightly oversized etc). The good thing is that the dome ventilator was useless mostly and we kept hatches open. Tracks which were a constant issue with T-54/55 were just the same with Type 59.

Most Chinese equipment did its job no worse than Soviet one. Sometimes it was even better, sometimes slightly worse. Type 63 APC's were awful mechanically though but they were also roomier that BTR-50 although I have never worked with them as they were mostly for coastal troops.

5 Soviet/Chinese tanks are often criticised because of the ergonomics. How did you find them in the Type-59?

Ergonomics is a very contentious debate because on both sides people misuse the word. For instance the ergonomics of the T-54 and Centurion (similar era tanks) aren't that different in theoretical principle. They differ in volume and equipment though. Russian/Chinese 100mm gun is both big and uses a very large ammunition case. While also being smaller in volume. This means that while the controls are not ergonomically problematic (except maybe the turret lock in rotation) the space you have to assume the same tasks is more limited and this has an impact on the efficiency. The other problem with the ergonomics is the possibility to compare them 1/1. This wasn't possible for me. I served on that system for a while, never transitioned to something else. So my opinion on the Type 59 cannot not be compared "on the job". However the main complaint I have and will always have with the T-54 series is the breech size going so deep in the turret that a lot of things we would need to do in case of emergency was next to impossible. Similarly the ammunition count. I know we usually only carried 25 rounds because the normal theoretical complement of 38 was too incapacitating. especially the lateral and rear hull rounds. And also for economical purposes (post 1974 stocks were dwindling). Given the layout of the floor, it was impossible for the loader to reach for the secondary ammunition with the rear hull rounds on. The hull floor on loader's side was better kept clean as the few cases there were far less easy to use than the front magazine. The powered turret controls also were very weird and would have been so much more logical to integrate them to gunner controls. So yes some ergonomical choices made by the Soviets and the Chinese were quirky but I cannot compare much of it with other tanks on use. On paper and on first view, sure a lot of non-integrated instruments made our jobs heavier. Especially the TC instruments. But because there weren't much instruments to begin with you get used to that pretty fast. I guess the big "ergonomic" issue is that you need to do a lot of small actions independently to obtain a result like gun laying, instead of a how it would become in later Soviet and Western tanks that a lot of processes were integrated and automated.

6. What was the typical ammunition load (% HE/AP/HEAT)? Was there a recommended type when facing other tanks? (In Yugoslav Army HEAT was main ammunition against tanks at all ranges and angles, AP for flank shots)

Typical ammunition load was 18/6/1 (Tip 76 HE/Tip 81 KT-Heat/Chinese incendiary round). The incendiary round was a lighter walled HE round with bigger explosive load. We would rather not carry it because of the casing walls were easily dented). Recommended type HEAT but given our tactical orders we would have always been in ambush situation or following infantry. So tanks could have been engaged with both ammunition for effect. The problem with AL approach is that we should have known where the enemy was and usually in both manoeuvres we did (4 on company size) we would to continually stop to see where we were let alone the enemy. AL Idea was that you didn't need AP/Kinetic because you couldn't use it other than on specialty targets (other tanks) while HE/HEAT could be used on any target with variable effects.

7. What was the typical rate of fire and how did it vary as you used the different ammunition bins?

Rate of fire was slow. When qualifying as a loader, best I did was 7 rounds a minute by using turret ones. I know my loader could do 8 with prepared rounds on the hull magazine. And that it was easier for him as a leftie. Usually in combat situation we wouldn't be able to fire more than 5 because of the recoil, space and fumes. There's also the spent casings you need to deal with. And that ate up a cycle. This also meant that the loader couldn't continuously keep feeding or do what the British do with their lap load, given you need to take care of the casings. And because of the breech travel I couldn't help him toss them out unless they rolled in my feet. This is also one thing that was quirky, if we had to engage in long exchanges, the hatches would have had to be open to both help with fumes but also to get rid of the spend casings.

8. How was the firing conducted at night? What was the effective range of the IR sight?

Night firings were capped at shortest target, 400m and it wasn't done at pitch black. We had to use flares if we suspected enemy movement, I had one 26.5mm flare gun and 4 sets of flares. 3 for illumination and 1 for marking. 12 rounds total. I think in almost 2 years we shot 4 times at dusk.

9. What was the maximum distance you covered in a day? Did the tank struggle to needed any extra maintenance? What about when operating in local conditions, especially in hilly areas (hard soil?), did the tank cope well?

Maximum distance was ~60km/day and was done twice when we deployed from Laç (White mountain) to the Kosovo border. We had not enough trailers so most of the tanks drove. We made it to the Drin river in about 5 hours because shared traffic with civilians. We had no technical issues the first day, but we had multiple avaries the second day when we passed the Drin river via bridge and started going steeper. Mostly engines overheating. It would go mostly downhill from there especially when we had to continuously take other positions from Viçidol to Tropoja. Engines were constantly overheating because of the climbs. But no serious breakdown

9. What was the maximum speed you reached? And going backwards?

Maximum speed in transit or just for fun? Tank could go up to 50 if the goal was to push it without real problems but then you had to deal with the momentum of that thing.
Retro was really painful because of the lack of gears. So walking pace i would say.

10. T-55 is seen as a simple tank, ideal for a conscript Army. How long do you think it takes to train a crew?

Actually the Type 59 is simple only in name. Some of the design features on the engine still force the trainees to be extremely accurate in their training. Especially the checks. Also as I said, the separation of certain tasks that remain simple, add to the load of a trainee, until he gets it. So yes simple and easy, but you need to oversee the training properly. Our training was 3 months on the tank. IMO enough for most tasks. The practice was a problem, in the sense that by 99 if there wasn't for the Kosovo war we would have used the tanks maybe twice a month and be done with them.

11. Did you practice NBC scenarios? What was the procedure? How did it affect the crew performance?

NBC scenarios were only practiced in manoeuvres and just demonstrated in training. NBC equipment was obsolete so we only had demonstration in classes. In manoeuvres the NBC equipment was actually to serve also for crossing bodies of water which is why it was issued and used.

The OPV equipment that we used partially was old, smelly, and frankly we didn't need it to ford given we passed though less than 1m of depth. It was scripted for the show. But IF we had to use it for real, it would have been a very nasty place pretty soon.

12. Type-59s have been used in a number of conflicts. Did you get any feedback/information from other operators on tactics/improvements/combat lessons?

I have had exchanges with Iraqi and Bosnian operators. They praise the machine for being sturdy but the Iraqi one I met in 2016 in Germany said it was useless unless you knew where the opposing side was.

13. Are you surprised about the Type-59 longevity?

I am not surprised about the longevity of many Soviet designed machines. I am just surprised about what I am seeing from many operators in the field even today. For instance Iraq and Syria. Tanks are not up to task protection wise vs almost everything that can be thrown at them this should make most of these operators play on the strengths of the system not its weaknesses (which awareness and mobility in tight spaces is). People say it is the AK of tanks, I agree.

14. For many years China was a close ally of Albania, and the Popular Army adopted Chinese Army OOB & equipment in units. Could you comment on this influence?

Yes but this lasted until 1985/86 then we went militarily bonkers. First of all we adopted a popular militia practice. Which meant that the standing army was pretty small. This meant also that a lot of equipment for this standing army was undermanned and thus under maintained pretty fast. The example of the Albanian tank battalions that went from 48 until 1966 to 62 from 1966 and until the Socialist system disappeared only made things worse. Because that "growth" in numbers was supposed to solve the inadequacy of the MTO/OMT (maintenance & technical operators) by clustering more tanks to centralized units. But this wasn't followed by a growth in the MTO. Basically by inflating battalions they equalized MTO units with battalion units, but the people on those MTO were the same, but with 25% more work. Some technical equipment from China, like our signal corps was still useable by 1999 but was replaced by second had western equipment from 1995 to 1999. But it was still a mess.

15. Who was seen as the main threat when you served (if any). What was the strategy to fight it off?

Main threat was an eventual incursion from the Yugoslav Army to cut off the rear bases of the KLA. But with NATO being in Albania and bombing the Yugoslavs it was more of scare than threat. Past 1999 we understood that with NATO in charge of the process there would not be any tangible threat for a while. We also thought the political situation would be solved. So far it hasn't. The main strategy in 1999 from that direction was to lock the mountain passes from Gjakova area and bleed anything that would advance with pre-arranged positions and firing tables. Those tables however were dated and we found ourselves that there were no pre-arranged firing positions anymore because those were all Communist legacies and locals had dismantled a lot of the network, if they had not repurposed them. On top of it we were just out of the Albanian Pyramid Scheme troubles, which had done more to dismantle AL military than any invader had in the last century or so.

16. Is there any anecdote you would like to share before we conclude the interview?

There are many anecdotes, like when going on firing range, guys had strapped ammunition crates on the engine deck and due to engine draft flaming up one crate actually caught fire and small arms ammo was popping. Another time when one tank in the school unit had its barrel gone so far that we fired it just to see how bad it would drift from target and we managed to have a double digit keyholing and come closer to the target on the next lane. Whole crew being stoned and driving around almost falling of a bridge. But my most intimate anecdote was the first day we were assigned to the tank. It smelled like old cigarette smoke, gasoline, some had jerked off in it, vomit and that typical iron/steel scent. From inside it was not too bad, some rust patches and all. So the company commander asked to take water-resistant paint and start repainting the interior of the tank. And we were almost done with the front of the tank, when the CO puts his head on the turret and literally explodes. We basically had failed to cover or remove every single warning plate and instrument gauge available in the turret. The cream paint had already caked on most of the plates and gauges so we were going to have to dip them in paint thinner which meant even more time spent on that. One of the unit mechanics helped waited until the CO stopped yelling and went away and came up with the most Albanian thing ever. He told us to screw the the warning plates out and put those of one of the HQ tank that basically never left the storage. So we did. And Co comes back to inspect and it's OKish. So we're all happy finally we got to do something else with the tanks. Couple of explanations from the instructors, first hands on approach. Things are ok. Then because of the situation then all the unit has to move up about 5 weeks into our training. And of course we needed to move as a whole unit which meant that the HQ tanks were also about to move up with us, so the one with the painted plates.

We had totally forgot about it. But the next morning around 7AM we were pulled out of PT and handed paint thinner and screwdrivers to operate and the tank was in the middle of the yard for everyone to see. And laugh.

History and military technology

Tuesday, 14 June 2022

Interview with a former Type-59 tanker in the Army of Albania

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